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Policy Research Working Paper 5146
Empirical evidence—including the current global crisis 
—suggests that shocks from advanced countries often 
have a disproportionate effect on developing economies. 
Can this account for the fact that aggregate fluctuations 
are larger and more persistent in the latter than in the 
former economies? And what are the mechanisms at play? 
This paper addresses these questions using a model of 
an industrial and a developing economy trading goods 
and assets, with (i) a product cycle shaping the range 
of intermediate goods used to produce new capital in 
each country, and (ii) investment adjustment costs in 
the developing economy. Innovation by the advanced 
economy results in new intermediate goods, at first 
produced at home, and eventually transferred to the 
This paper—a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to understand the effects of innovation and technological upgrading on the macroeconomic performance 
of developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
author may be contacted at nloayza@worldbank.org.  
developing economy through direct investment. The 
pace of innovation and technology transfer is driven by 
profitability. This process of technology diffusion creates 
a medium-term connection between both economies, 
over and above the short-term link through trade. 
Calibration of the model to match Mexico-United States 
trade and foreign direct investment flows shows that this 
mechanism can explain why shocks to the United States 
economy have a larger effect on Mexico than on the 
United States itself, and hence why Mexico shows higher 
volatility than the United States; why business cycles in 
the United States lead to medium-term fluctuations in 
Mexico; and why consumption is not less volatile than 
output in Mexico.Medium-Term Business Cycles in Developing Countries1
Diego Cominy, Norman Loayzaz, Farooq Pasha￿ and Luis Servenz2
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1 Introduction
At the end of 2007, the US economy entered a recession which, by the ￿rst quarter of 2009,
had reduced US GDP by 2.2%. The Mexican economy was showing no sign of distress until
the US recession began. Despite that, Mexican GDP declined by 7.8% during the same period.
This and similar episodes from other developing countries1 motivate several questions: Why
do shocks to developed economies a⁄ect developing countries so much? Does the response of
developing economies to shocks that originate in their developed neighbors account for the
larger volatility of developing economies? More broadly, what ingredients do our models need
to incorporate in order to account for the unique features of economic ￿ uctuations in developing
economies?
To investigate these questions, we build a two-country asymmetric DSGE model. One of
the countries is developed (e.g., the US) while the other is a developing country (e.g., Mexico).
The model has two salient features. First, a product cycle structure determines the range
of intermediate goods used to produce new capital in each country. Second, we introduce
investment ￿ ow adjustment costs in the developing economy.
On the product cycle, we follow the approach in Vernon (1966), Wells (1972), and Stokey
(1991). New intermediate goods result from R&D expenditures in the US. To increase the range
of intermediate goods exported to Mexico (i.e. extensive margin of trade), it is necessary to incur
sunk costs. Further investments (i.e. FDI) can facilitate the transfer of the intermediate goods
production to Mexico from where they are exported back to the US. On adjustment costs, we
adopt the approach in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), where capital accumulation
is subject to convex adjustment costs. These costs are incurred when the level of investment
changes over time (so that they are zero in the steady state). Moreover, since adjustment costs
are at least partially related to the quality of infrastructure and public services, we assume that
they are primarily relevant in developing countries.
As in standard trade models, shocks to the US a⁄ect the demand for Mexican exports. This
generates a positive co-movement between the US and Mexico￿ s outputs in the short term.
1GDP decline over this period in the following sample of countries: Malaysia 7.8%, Philipines 12.1%, Singa-
pore 7.4%, South Korea 3.3%, Taiwan 13.8%, Thailand 7.7%.
1But this link is insu¢ cient to generate a larger and more persistent response in Mexico than
in the US to a US shock that we see in the data. By making the extensive margin of trade
and FDI endogenous, we introduce two mechanisms by which US shocks a⁄ect the ￿ ow of new
technologies to Mexico. In particular, US shocks a⁄ect the value of exporting and transferring
technologies, inducing pro-cyclical investment in exporting new technologies and FDI ￿ ows.
Since on average the di⁄usion of technology takes time, variations in the extensive margin
of trade and FDI a⁄ect Mexican productivity and output only gradually. This generates a
hump-shaped response in these variables in response to a US shock.
Our model generates large ￿ uctuations in Mexican productivity. This is at the root of why
US shocks have larger and more persistent e⁄ects on Mexican output than in the US itself.
Intuitively, the slow pace of international di⁄usion of intermediate goods generates a large gap
between the stock of technologies available for production in the US and Mexico. As a result,
when a shock a⁄ects the return to exporting new technologies to Mexico, it induces very wide
￿ uctuations in the ￿ ow of new technologies exported to Mexico resulting in wide swings, over
the medium term, in the stock of technologies in Mexico. In the US, in contrast, there is not
such a large stock of technologies waiting to be adopted. Thus, the ￿ uctuations in the stock of
technologies and productivity are signi￿cantly smaller than in Mexico.
Intermediate goods are used to produce new capital and the e¢ ciency of production of new
capital is increasing in the number intermediate goods available in the economy. Thus, the
reduction in the ￿ ow of intermediate goods associated with a US recession generates a gradual
increase in the price of Mexican capital. In the presence of adjustment costs, ￿rms respond to
the prospect of a higher future price of capital by reducing investment today. This decline in
investment is the ultimate driver of the larger initial response of Mexican than US output to
a US shock. The decline in the speed of di⁄usion of intermediate goods to Mexico generates a
subsequent decline in Mexican GDP.
Mexican shocks have a very small e⁄ect on the US economy. However, they have important
e⁄ects on Mexican consumption, leading to what might be called excess sensitivity of con-
sumption to output shocks. Even in our context of forward-looking equilibrium, this occurs
because of the presence of both adjustment costs to investment and incomplete international
credit markets for Mexico. The gradual increase in the price of capital that follows a reces-
sionary shock in Mexico leads to higher real interest rates in Mexico despite the decline in the
2marginal product of capital.2;3 The prospect of higher current and future interest rates induces
Mexican consumers to save, depressing consumption. The combination of adjustment costs and
prospects of a higher future price of capital reduce the initial decline of investment and generate
a counter-cyclical current account. This relaxes the resource constraint enabling a decline in
Mexican consumption that is larger than the initial decline in output. As a result, the model
is able to generate more volatile consumption than output in developing economies, which is a
regularity documented in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
Section 4.3 presents evidence on the relevance of the key mechanisms in the model. First,
it shows that the ￿ ow of new intermediate goods to Mexico ￿ measured by the growth in
the number of six-digit manufacturing and durable manufacturing categories with positive US
exports to Mexico ￿co-moves positively with both US and Mexican GDP. Second, the model
predicts that this co-movement generates a strong lead of US output over Mexican GDP and
over the relative price of capital in Mexico. We indeed ￿nd that these predictions are borne by
the data. Third, the model also predicts that one key aspect of the large e⁄ect that US shocks
have on Mexican GDP is the e⁄ect that they have on Mexican investment. Consistent with this,
we ￿nd a strong positive co-movement between US GDP and Mexican investment in the data.
Finally, a key driver of the high volatility of consumption in Mexico is the counter-cyclicality
of the price of capital in Mexico which generates a similar cyclical pattern in interest rates.
The data also support this mechanism since we ￿nd that the relative price of capital is strongly
counter-cyclical in Mexico and more so than in the US. It is important to remark that, in
addition to matching these qualitative features of the data, our model provides a quantitatively
accurate account of their strength.
Our model is related to several literatures. First, the empirical literature on synchronization
of business cycle ￿ uctuations across countries (e.g. Frankel and Rose 1997 and 1998) has
shown that countries that trade more tend to have more synchronized business cycles.4 Second,
the literature on medium-term business cycles (Comin and Gertler, 2006, and Comin, Gertler
and Santacreu, 2009) has shown that endogenous R&D and technology adoption mechanisms
introduce signi￿cant endogenous propagation and ampli￿cation. This literature, however, has
considered single-country models of developed economies and therefore is not suited to study
2In section 4 we provide evidence on the strong counter-cyclicality of the price of capital in Mexico.
3The counter-cyclicality of real interest rates in developing countries is emphasized by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005).
4More recently, Sosa (2008) has investigated the co-movement patterns of US and Mexico using VARs .
3the co-movement between developed and developing countries.
Third, our model is related to Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), who argue that, in a reduced form
sense, shocks to developing countries are more persistent than shocks to developed economies
and use this to explain the higher volatility of consumption relative to output observed in
developing countries. Our model provides a microfoundation for their assumption based on the
slow di⁄usion of technologies.
A fourth related literature uses small open economy macro models to explore business cycles
in developing countries (e.g. Neumayer and Perri, 2005, Mendoza, 2008, and Tsyrennikov,
2007). This approach does not explicitly model the link between developed and developing
economies. It instead assumes that domestic interest rates are linked to the world interest
rates which are exogenous. As a result, they are not well suited to explain the observed lead-
lag relationship between Mexico and the US. Some of these models have been successful in
generating a higher volatility in consumption than output with the introduction of frictions
in capital markets. However, the type of capital ￿ ows they rely on (international borrowing
and lending) has become a small fraction of international capital ￿ ows to developing countries.
As shown by Loayza and Serven (2006), approximately 70% of the capital ￿ ows to developing
countries since 1990 have been FDI.5 Our model takes the opposite approach of assuming that
FDI is the only international capital ￿ ow. In this sense, it is complementary to the SOE models.
Finally, our model is related to the new trade literature that has emphasized the relevance of
the extensive margin of trade (i.e. how many intermediate goods are traded) to explain trade
volumes (Melitz, 2003, Kehoe and Ruhl, 2002, and Bernard et al., 2007) and international co-
movement (Melitz and Ghironi, 2005, and Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson, 2009).6 The elegance
and tractability of these models follows, in part, because the number of intermediate goods
exported is not a state variable. This feature, however, makes di¢ cult for these models to
generate the observed hump-shaped e⁄ect of US shocks on Mexican output. The static nature
of the extensive margin decision implies that it is basically driven by ￿ uctuations in relative
5The FDI share is even larger when restricting attention to private capital ￿ ows and when focusing in Latin
America and Asia.
6This latter paper is the most complementary to ours. It develops an elegant model of outsourcing to explain
the co-movement between the manufacturing sectors in the US and Mexico as well as the higher volatility in the
Mexican manufacturing sectors than in the US. Co-movement follows from perfect international insurance of
consumption and from the possibility of outsourcing production. The higher volatility follows from the smaller
size of the outsourced sector in Mexico and because the cyclicality of US wages dampens the e⁄ects of US
demand shocks on domestic demand triggering outsourcing to Mexico.
4wages. However, in the data, US wages have been almost acyclical over the last 20 years.7
Hence, they are surely not the main source of co-movement between Mexico and the US. A
￿nal di⁄erence between our model and those of the new trade literature is that, since we have
investment in physical capital, output and consumption in our model are quite di⁄erent objects
and we can attempt to understand why consumption is more volatile than output in developing
countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
discusses the symmetric equilibrium and provides some intuition about the key mechanisms.
Section 4 evaluates the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Before presenting the model, we brie￿ y describe its main features. Ours is a two-country model
with trade in intermediate goods. The number of intermediate goods available for production
determines the technology to produce new capital. Three margins determine the number of
intermediate goods available for production in each country: (i) R&D investments create new
intermediate goods in the North (N); (ii) investments in exporting intermediate goods enlarge
the set of intermediate goods exported to the South (S); (iii) FDI transfers the production of
the intermediate good to S: Capital markets are assumed to be perfect within countries but
international capital ￿ ows other than FDI are ruled out.
2.1 Resource constraints
Let Yct be gross ￿nal output. In each country, ￿nal output may be used for consumption, Cct,
investment, Ict; paying overhead costs, Oct; and government spending, Gct. In addition, N0s
output can be used to conduct research and development, St; that leads to new intermediate
goods and to make intermediate goods suitable for export to S; X
g
t : N0s ￿rms can also conduct
foreign direct investment by using S0s ￿nal output to transfer the production of the intermediate
goods to S; XT
t . The aggregate resource constraints can then be written as follows:
YNt = CNt + INt + ONt + GNt + St + X
g
t (1)
7The correlation between HP-￿ltered output and real wages since 1990 in the US is 0.2.
5YSt = CSt + ISt + OSt + GSt + X
T
t (2)
In turn, let Jct be newly produced capital and ￿(:) be the depreciation rate of capital. Then
capital evolve as follows:






where gK denotes the steady state growth rate of capital. ￿(Uct) is the depreciation rate which is
increasing and convex in the utilization rate as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (1988).
The convex function ￿c(:) represents the adjustment costs that are incurred when the level
of investment changes over time. We assume that ￿c(1) = 0; ￿
0
c(1) = 0; so that there are no
adjustment costs in the steady state.8 Note also that the function ￿c(:) is indexed by c re￿ ecting
international asymmetries in the magnitude of adjustment costs.
Next, let P k
ct be the price of this capital in units of domestic ￿nal output. Given competitive





A distinguishing feature of our framework is that P k
ct evolves endogenously in each country.
One of the key sources of variation in P k
ct is the pace at which new technologies embodied in
new intermediate goods arrive in the economy which depends on the agents response to overall
macroeconomic conditions, as we describe below.
2.2 Capital
Physical capital is immobile across countries. It is produced in two stages. First, a continuum
of NK
ct di⁄erentiated ￿rms construct new capital. Each uses as input the continuum Act of the
di⁄erentiated intermediate capital goods available for production in the economy. Let Jct (r) be
new capital produced by ￿rm r and Ir
ct(s) the amount of intermediate capital the ￿rm employs











with ￿ > 1. Note that each supplier s of intermediate capital goods has a bit of market power.
Pro￿t maximization implies that the supplier sets the price of the s intermediate capital good
8This formulation is now standard in macro models (Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans (2005), Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2008), and Comin, Gertler and Santacreu (2009)).
6as a ￿xed markup ￿ times the marginal cost of production. In N; it takes one unit of ￿nal
output to produce one unit of intermediate. So, the marginal cost is unity. To capture the
comparative advantage of the South in assembling manufacturing goods (e.g. Iyer, 2005), we
assume that it takes 1=￿(< 1) units of country S output to produce a unit of a intermediate
good in S:
In addition, there is an iceberg transport cost of shipping the good internationally. In
particular, 1=  (where   < 1) units of the good need to be shipped so that one unit arrives.
Observe that there are e¢ ciency gains in producing new capital from increasing the number
of intermediate inputs, Act. These e¢ ciency gains re￿ ect embodied technological change and
are the main source of variation in the relative price of capital, P k
ct; over the long and medium
term.
New capital, Jct, is a CES composite of the output of the NK










with ￿K > 1.
We allow the number of capital producers NK
ct to be endogenously determined by a free
entry condition in order to generate high frequency variation in the real price of capital that is
consistent with the evidence (e.g. Comin and Gertler, 2006 and section 4.2 in this paper).9 We
can decompose P K
ct into the product of two terms: the medium term wholesale price, P
K
ct; that
is governed exclusively by technological conditions in the medium term and a high-frequency
component, P K
ct = ￿ P K
ct ; that is instead governed by cyclical factors.10
We assume that the per period operating cost of a ￿nal capital good producer, ok
ct; grows









c is a constant. As in Comin and Gertler (2006), this captures the notion that the
operating costs are increasing in the sophistication of the economy, as measured by P
k
ctKct; and
9An alternative formulation with similar implications for the high frequency ￿ uctuations in the relative price
of capital would be to introduce counter-cyclical price markups.
10In particular,
￿ PK
ct = (Act)￿(￿￿1) (7)
7guarantees balanced growth: At the margin, the pro￿ts of capital producers must cover this














The adjustment costs introduce a wedge between the price of new capital (P K
ct ) and the price
of installed capital (P I
ct) when the ￿ ow of real investment deviates from the steady state level.
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Jct (1 + gK)
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The e¢ ciency of the production of new capital goods depends on the number of intermediate
goods available for production Act: Next, we describe the processes of invention, international
di⁄usion and transfer of production which is inspired by the product lifecycle literature (Vernon,
1966). Intermediate goods are invented in country N and at this ￿rst stage they are local
(i.e. can only be used in N): After successfully undertaking a stochastic investment, the good
becomes global (i.e. can be exported to S): At a ￿nal stage, the production of intermediate
goods can be transferred to S in order to bene￿t from the comparative advantage of S at
producing intermediate goods. This entails another stochastic investment though this time it
is in terms of country S output. These investments constitute the ￿ ow of FDI from N to S:
We denote by Al; Ag and AT the stock of local, global and transferred intermediate goods: The













8Technology ￿ ows determine trade ￿ ows. Country N exports to S the Ag intermediate goods
which have become exportable while S exports to N the AT intermediate goods whose produc-
tion has been transferred to S: The only other good that is traded in this economy is energy as
we discuss below. Next we present the conditions that characterize the technology dynamics in
each economy.
Creation of new intermediate goods
Innovators in N create new intermediate goods by investing ￿nal output into R&D activities.
In exchange they are granted a patent which ensures the monopolistic rents from being the sole
producer of the intermediate good. R&D is ￿nanced with loans from the households. Let
St(p) be the total amount of R&D by innovator p: Let ’t be a productivity parameter that
the innovator takes as given and let 1 ¬ ￿ the probability that any existing intermediate good
becomes obsolete in the subsequent period. Then, the law of motion for the stock of technologies
developed by innovator p is:
ANt+1 (p) ¬ ANt (p) = ’tSt(p) ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)ANt(p) (13)
We assume that ’t depends on the aggregate stock of innovations in N, ANt, the medium
term wholesale value of the capital stock P
k
Nt KNt; and aggregate research and development












with 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 and where ￿ is a scale parameter. This formulation is borrowed from Comin
and Gertler (2006) and permits us ￿ exibility in calibrating the impact of R&D while ensuring
the existence of a balanced growth path without scale e⁄ects.
In equilibrium, agents engage in R&D activities until the cost of developing a new interme-




where vt is the market value of the patent to produce a local intermediate good. vt can be
























where ￿t denotes the per period pro￿ts of a local intermediate goods producer, x
g
t is the number





9is the associated probability of a successful adaptation where ￿(:) satis￿es ￿
0 > 0; ￿
00 < 0, vg is
the market value of a global intermediate good; and ￿
g
t is a scaling factor, taken as exogenous










where bg is a positive constant.
Investment in exporting
Intermediate goods producers in N can expand the market for their products by exporting
them to S: Prior to this, however, the producer must successfully market the intermediate good
in S and adapt it to be suitable for production in S: The optimal intensity of this investment
equalizes at the margin the cost and the expected bene￿ts of exporting the intermediate good


























The marginal cost of investing one unit of output in exporting the good (LHS) is 1, while
the expected marginal bene￿t is equal to the associated increase in the probability of exporting
times the discounted gain from transforming the local good in a global intermediate good.
In the symmetric equilibrium, all producers of local intermediate goods invest the same
amount in making the good exportable to S; and, as a result, face the rate of transformation
of local into global intermediate goods, ￿
g












After expanding the market to S; the value of an intermediate good, v
g










































t denotes the per period pro￿ts of a global intermediate goods producer, xT
t is the num-
ber of units of country S0s ￿nal output spent by the innovator in transferring the production of
the intermediate good to S; et is the exchange rate (dollars per peso), ￿(￿T
t xT
t ) is the associated
probability of successfully completing this foreign direct investment, where the function ￿(:)
satis￿es ￿
0 > 0; ￿
00 < 0, vT is the market value of the company that produces a transferred
10intermediate good; and ￿T
















t be the rate at which the production of global intermediate goods is transferred from
N to S: The law of motion for the stock of transferred intermediate goods, AT











The optimal intensity of FDI, xT
t ; equalizes the private marginal costs and expected bene￿ts
of transferring the production to S: The marginal cost is et, while the expected marginal bene￿t
is the increase in the probability of succeeding in the FDI times the discounted gain from






























Finally, the market value of an intermediate good whose production has been transferred to











t denotes the per period operating global pro￿ts of the company that produces a
transferred intermediate good.
2.4 Production of gross output
Gross output, Yct; is produced in two stages. At the ￿rst stage, each of Nct di⁄erentiated
output producers, indexed by j, combine capital, Kcjt, labor, Lcjt, and energy, Ecjt, to produce
its di⁄erentiated output, Yct(j) according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology:






where g is the exogenous growth rate of disembodied productivity,11 and U denotes the intensity
of utilization of capital. The markets where ￿rms rent the factors of production (i.e. labor and
11For simplicity, we assume that it is exogenous. It is quite straightforward to endogenize it as shown in
Comin and Gertler (2006).
11capital) are perfectly competitive.
At the second stage, gross output, Yct; is produced competitively by aggregating the Nct








where ￿(> 1) is inversely related to the price elasticity of substitution across goods. Producers




Free entry equalizes the per period operating pro￿ts to the overhead costs determining the
number of ￿nal goods ￿rms Nct.
￿ ¬ 1
￿




Oil represents a signi￿cant share of Mexican exports to the US. To account for this in the
calibration of the model, we assume that the government in country S is endowed with Ee
St
units of energy. Let Ect denote the aggregate consumption of energy in country c. Country N
imports Ex
t units of energy to country S; and buys the rest of its energy needs, Ew
t , from the











For simplicity, we assume that the price of energy, P E, is ￿xed.
2.6 Households
There is a representative household that consumes, supplies labor and saves. It may save by
either accumulating capital or lending to innovators. The household also has equity claims in
all monopolistically competitive ￿rms. It makes one period loans to innovators and also rents
capital that it has accumulated directly to ￿rms. It is important to stress, though, that there
is no international lending and borrowing. That is, US FDI in Mexico is the only item in the
Mexican ￿nancial account.
12Let Cct be consumption and ￿w
ct a preference shifter. Then the household maximizes its














subject to the budget constraint




ctKct+1 + RctBct ¬ Bct+1 ¬ Tct (31)
where ￿ct re￿ ects the pro￿ts of monopolistic competitors paid out fully as dividends to house-
holds, Dct denotes the rental rate of capital, Bct is the total loans the household makes at t¬1
that are payable at t; and Tct re￿ ects lump sum taxes.
Government
Government spending is ￿nanced every period with lump sum transfers and the revenues
from energy:





We defer to the Appendix the formal de￿nition and complete characterization of the equilibrium.
Here we just present the main equations to highlight the e⁄ects of endogenizing the investment
decisions that determine the extensive margin of trade and FDI. In a model without these
investments, such as Comin and Gertler (2006), capital, Kct; and the stock of intermediate
goods, ANt; are the only endogenous state variables. Here, we have two additional endogenous
states, the stock of global intermediate goods, A
g
t; and the stock of transferred intermediate
goods, AT
t which introduce new dynamics in Mexican output and the relative price of capital.









It is convenient to de￿ne the variable aNt as the ratio of the e⁄ective number of intermediate
good in N relative to Al
t; and aSt as the ratio of the e⁄ective number of intermediate goods in





































Then, the pro￿ts accrued by a producer of local, global and transferred intermediate goods






































































Note that ￿t; ￿
g
t and ￿T




increase with investment in S: Since the value of local, global and transferred intermediate
goods, de￿ned in (16), (20) and (24), is equal to the present discounted pro￿ts net of investments
in exporting and FDI, v; vg and vT are also pro-cyclical. The pro-cyclicality of the value of
intermediate goods has important implications for the dynamics of productivity.
First, since the costs of conducting R&D are acyclical and v is pro-cyclical, free entry (15)
implies that R&D expenditures are pro-cyclical. Second, the capital gains from starting to
export intermediate goods (i.e. v
g




are both pro-cyclical since vg ￿ uctuates more than v and vT more than vg.12 According to (18)
and (23), this implies that the resources devoted to exporting and transferring the production
of intermediate goods to S (i.e. xg and xT) are pro-cyclical.
The slow pace of international di⁄usion of technologies implies that Ag and AT respond
slowly to xg and xT: This introduces a lag in the response of the level of technology in S to
shocks which generates signi￿cant medium term ￿ uctuations in Mexican macro variables. In
this way, a contractionary shock in N generates an initial decline in S0s output due to the
12The ￿rst follows because vg ￿ uctuates in response to current and future investment in both S and N while
v only responds to investment in N: The second follows because transferred intermediate goods are cheaper and
therefore face higher demand than global intermediate goods.
14lower demand for S0s exports but also generates a more persistent decline driven by the lower
productivity.
Since intermediate goods are the source of embodied technical change, the slow response of
ASt to shocks generates counter-cyclical ￿ uctuations in the Mexican price of capital over the

















Mexican ￿rms would like to reduce drastically investment precisely when the price of new
capital peaks. However, this would be too costly because of the costs of adjusting the ￿ ow of
investment. Instead, in anticipation of the future higher price of capital, ￿rms start reducing
investment when the contractionary shock hits the US economy. This collapse in investment
adds to the lower demand for Mexican exports generating a larger initial e⁄ect of US shocks in
Mexican than in US output. As we shall see, this explains why developing economies are more
volatile than their developed neighbors.
In the neoclassical growth model, the interest rate is equal to the marginal product of
capital net of depreciation. Since the marginal product of capital is pro-cyclical, so are interest
rates. However, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show that in developing countries interest rates
are counter-cyclical. This is the case also in our model because, in addition to the marginal










Recall from the optimal investment equation (10) that the price of installed capital is equal
to the price of new capital plus a wedge that re￿ ects changes in investment ￿ ows. Thus, the
prospects of increases in the price of new capital in response to a contractionary shock, lead to
high interest rates today. This e⁄ect adds to the standard permanent income e⁄ect of output
on consumption generating a very signi￿cant contraction in consumption in S.
The adjustment costs contribute to making the decline in consumption feasible. In particular,
they moderate the initial collapse in Mexican investment following a recessionary domestic
13Short term ￿ uctuations in the relative price of capital are driven by the exchange rate and by pro-cyclical
entry.
15shock absorbing resources that force Mexican consumption to decline. As we shall see below,
these mechanisms can explain why consumption is not less volatile than output in developing
countries.
4 Model Evaluation
In this section we explore the ability of the model to generate cycles at short and medium term
frequencies that resemble those observed in the data in developed and, specially, in developing
economies. Given our interest in medium term ￿ uctuations, a period in the model is set to
a year. We solve the model by loglinearizing around the deterministic balanced growth path
and then employing the Anderson-Moore code, which provides numerical solutions for general
￿rst order systems of di⁄erence equations. We describe the calibration before turning to some
numerical exercises.
4.1 Calibration
The calibration we present here is meant as a benchmark. We have found that our results
are robust to reasonable variations around this benchmark. To the extent possible, we use the
restrictions of balanced growth to pin down parameter values. Otherwise, we look for evidence
elsewhere in the literature. There are a total of twenty-six parameters. Twelve appear routinely
in other studies. Six relate to the process of innovation and research and development and were
introduced in Comin and Gertler (2006). Finally, there are six new parameters that relate
to trade and the process of international di⁄usion of intermediate goods and two related to
the adjustment costs. We defer the discussion of the calibration of the standard and R&D
parameters to the Appendix and focus here on the adjustment costs parameters and those that
govern the interactions between N and S:
We treat asymmetrically adjustment costs in Mexico and the US. We do this for two reasons.
First, there is ample evidence on the larger costs of entry, obtaining construction permits and
import licenses in Mexico relative to the US (e.g. Gwartney et al., 2007, World Bank, and
Miller and Holmes, 2009). Second, above and beyond the micro evidence on adjustment costs,
our goal is to build a model of the Mexican economy and its response to US shocks. To achieve
this goal, we need to build a model of the US economy that resembles as much as possible
the data. As we discuss below, even when we set ￿
00
N(1) to zero, our model generates series for
16US investment that have less volatility than in the data. Introducing adjustment costs to US
investment would accentuate this problem.
There are no estimates, to the best of our knowledge, for ￿
00
S: Given that, we think that a
conservative estimate is a value in the upper end of the range of estimates for the adjustment
cost parameter in the US. We use the estimate of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
and set ￿
00
S(1) to 1.5. We also set ￿
00
N(1) to 0:
We calibrate the six parameters that govern the interactions between N and S by matching
information on trade ￿ ows, and US FDI in Mexico and micro evidence on the cost of exporting
and the relative productivity of US and Mexico in manufacturing. First, we set ￿ to 2 to match
the Mexican relative cost advantage over the US in manufacturing identi￿ed by Iyer (2005).
We set the inverse of the iceberg transport cost parameter,  ; to 0.95,14 the steady state
probability of exporting an intermediate good, ￿
g; to 0.0875, and the steady state probability
of transferring the production of an intermediate good to S; ￿
T; to 0.0055 to approximately
match the share in Mexican GDP of Mexican exports and imports to and from the US (i.e.
18% and 14%, respectively) and the share of intermediate goods produced in the US that
are exported to Mexico. Speci￿cally, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) estimate
that approximately 20 percent of US durable manufacturing plants export. However, these
plants produce a much larger share of products than non-exporters. As a result, the share of
intermediate goods exported should also be signi￿cantly larger. We target a value of 33% for
the share of intermediate goods produced in the US that are exported. This yields an average
di⁄usion lag to Mexico of 11 years which seems reasonable.
Das, Roberts and Tybout (2006) have estimated that the sunk cost of exporting for Colom-
bian manufacturing plants represents between 20 and 40 percent of their annual revenues from
exporting. We set the elasticity of ￿
g with respect to investments in exporting, ￿g; to 0.85
so that the sunk cost of exporting represents approximately 30 percent of the revenues from
exporting. The elasticity of ￿
T with respect to FDI expenses, ￿T; together with the steady
state value of ￿
T determine the share of US FDI in Mexico in steady state. We set ￿T to 0.5 so
that the US FDI in Mexico represents approximately 2% of Mexican GDP.
14Interestingly, the value of   required to match the trade ￿ ows between the US and Mexico is smaller than
the values used in the literature (i.e. 1/1.2 in Corsetti et al., 2008) because of the closeness of Mexico and the
US and their lower (inexistent after 1994) trade barriers.
174.2 Impulse response functions
To be clear, the exercises that follow are meant simply as a ￿rst pass at exploring whether
the mechanisms we emphasize have potential for explaining the data: They are not formal
statistical tests. For simplicity, the only two shocks we consider are innovations to the wage
markup, ￿w
ct, in N (US) and in S (Mexico): Several authors15 have argued that these shocks
may capture important drivers of business cycles. However, we are not vested in the nature of
the shocks. We show that the our conclusions are robust to other shocks (i.e. productivity and
relative price of capital).
Response to a US shock
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions to a US wage markup shock. Solid lines
are used for the responses in Mexico while dashed lines represent the responses in the US. The
response of the US economy to a domestic shock is very similar to the single-country version
presented in Comin and Gertler (2006). In particular, a positive wage markup shock contracts
the US labor supply (panel 2) causing a recession in the US (panel 1). In addition to the decline
in hours worked, the initial decline in US output is driven by exit in the ￿nal goods sector and
by a decline in the utilization rate. The response of US output to the shock is more persistent
than the shock itself (panel 12) due to the endogenous propagation mechanisms of the model.
In particular, the domestic recession reduces the demand for intermediate goods and, hence,
the return to R&D investments. This leads to a temporary decline in the rate of development
of new technologies but to a permanent e⁄ect on the level of new technologies relative to trend.
The long run e⁄ect of the shock on output is approximately 45% of its initial response.
The US shock has important e⁄ects on the Mexican economy. Upon impact, the shock
causes a decline in Mexican output that is larger than the US contraction (0.63 vs. 0.46). The
Mexican recession is driven by two forces: the decline in the demand for Mexican exports to
the US (panel 10) and the collapse of Mexican investment (panel 4).
Unlike the US, the response of Mexican output to a US shock is hump-shaped. At the root
of this response we ￿nd the dynamics of international technology di⁄usion. In particular, the
shock to ￿w
Nt reduces the return on exporting new intermediate goods and transferring their
production to Mexico. As a result, fewer resources are devoted to these investments (panel 7)
gradually reducing the stock of intermediate goods in Mexico relative to the steady state (panel
8). Since productivity is determined by the stock of intermediate goods, the slow international
15E.g. Hall (1997 ), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002).
18di⁄usion of new technologies also leads to a gradual decline in Mexican productivity which
causes a hump-shaped response of output.16
Our model generates large ￿ uctuations in Mexican productivity. This is at the root of why
US shocks have larger e⁄ects on Mexican output than in the US itself. Intuitively, the slow
pace of international di⁄usion of intermediate goods generates a large gap between the stock of
technologies available for production in the US and Mexico. As a result, when a shock a⁄ects
the return to exporting new technologies to Mexico, it induces very wide ￿ uctuations in the
￿ ow of new technologies exported to Mexico resulting in wide swims, over the medium term,
in the stock of technologies in Mexico. In the US, in contrast, there is no such a large stock
of technologies waiting to be adopted. Thus, the ￿ uctuations in the stock of technologies and
productivity are signi￿cantly smaller than in Mexico.
To illustrate further the role of the international di⁄usion of technologies in the Mexican
output dynamics, Figure 2 plots the impulse response function to a shock to ￿w
Nt after shutting
down the extensive margin of trade and FDI channels. When eliminating these linkages between
the US and Mexico, the e⁄ect of the shock on Mexican output is (i) always smaller than in the
US, (ii) monotonic and (iii) signi￿cantly less persistent than when these adoption margins are
endogenous.
In contrast, in our model, the response of Mexican output to a US shock is more persistent
than the US response and much more persistent than the shock itself. Thus, endogenous
international technology di⁄usion can provide a microfoundation for the ￿nding of Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) that (in a reduced form speci￿cation) the shocks faced by developing countries
are more persistent than those faced by developed economies.
The gradual decline in ASt slowly reduces the e¢ ciency of production of new capital leading
to a gradual increase in the price of capital (panel 6). The initial response of Mexican investment
to these prospects for the price of capital largely depends on the magnitude of the adjustment
costs. Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions to a contractionary ￿w
Nt shock with
no adjustment costs. In the absence of adjustment costs, ￿rms want to time the decline in
investment with the peak in the price of new capital. As a result investment does not decline
initially but declines sharply later on.
In the presence of adjustment costs, it is very costly to follow this strategy and companies
start reducing their investment when the shock hits the economy in anticipation of the future
16In the US the response to the shock is monotonic because of the larger e⁄ect of the shock on domestic
demand and because technology di⁄uses faster domestically than internationally.
19increase in the price of capital. As a result, a contractionary US shock generates a collapse of
Mexican investment upon impact (panel 4 of Figure 1) which continues to decline as the price of
capital increases and the economy contracts further. As we shall show below, the data supports
the model￿ s prediction of a strong co-movement between US output and Mexican investment.
The response of investment to US shocks signi￿cantly ampli￿es the initial response of Mex-
ican output to the US shock. To see this, compare the output responses with and without
adjustment costs (i.e. Figure 1 vs 3). In the absence of adjustment costs, Mexican investment
does not decline when the shock hits the economy and the only force that drives the Mexican
recession is the decline in demand for Mexican exports to the US. Since the share of exports
in Mexican GDP is not that large, Mexican output declines only by 0.05% in response to a 1%
increase in ￿w
Nt: With adjustment costs, the collapse of investment contributes to the Mexican
recession and output declines by 0.66% in response to the same shock. Note however, that in
both cases, the decline in Mexican output eventually exceeds the size of the recession gener-
ated in the US. Similarly, the hump-shaped response of Mexican output is independent of the
calibration of the adjustment costs.
For concreteness, we have used wage markup shocks as the sole source of ￿ uctuations in our
model. It is important to stress that our ￿ndings do not hinge on the nature of the shock. This
is illustrated in Figure 4 where we consider the model￿ s response to other two shocks that play
a signi￿cant role in the business cycle literature. These are a (negative) TFP shock (second
row) and to a (positive) shock to the price of investment (third row).17 In response to these
shocks, the model also generates a large initial decline in Mexican output driven partly by a
collapse in investment and a subsequent contraction in productivity due to a decline in the ￿ ow
of technologies to Mexico.
Response to a Mexican shock
Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions to a Mexican wage markup, ￿w
St; shock in
the US (dashed) and in Mexico (solid). There are some striking di⁄erences with Figure 1.
First, a Mexican shock has virtually no e⁄ect in the US. This follows from the di⁄erence in
size between the two economies but also from the fact that technologies ￿ ow from the US to
Mexico and not otherwise. One consequence of this is that the Mexican shock has a smaller
e⁄ect than the US shock on the extensive margin of trade and FDI. As a result, the e⁄ect of
￿w
St on Mexican GDP is more transitory than the e⁄ect of a US shock.
However, the most signi￿cant observation from Figure 5 is that Mexican shocks have a larger
17Figure A.1 in the appendix, shows the equivalent responses for the model without adjustment costs.
20e⁄ect on Mexican consumption than on output. This is the result of both the endogenous
relative price of capital and the adjustment costs. We explain next the intuition for this result.
By the logic explained above, a contractionary shock leads to a gradual increase in the price
of capital. The prospect of a future higher price of capital has two e⁄ects. On the one hand,
it prevents investment from falling too much initially. (This is also achieved by the adjustment
costs. See the contrast with the impulse response to a Mexican shock in the model without
adjustment costs in Figure 6.)18 On the other, they raise current and future interest rates
despite the lower marginal product of capital due to the recession. Current and future high
interest rates induce consumers to save more today hence reducing their consumption.
Such a signi￿cant decline in Mexican consumption is feasible for two reasons. First, invest-
ment does not fall too much initially. Second, consistent with the data, the trade balance is
very counter-cyclical. This, in turn, is a consequence of the persistent response of investment to
the shock. Because the response of Mexican investment is so persistent, the value of transfer-
ring the production of intermediate goods to Mexico, vT; declines more than net income from
transferred technologies, ￿T; (panel 9). This leads to a very signi￿cant decline in FDI in￿ ows
into Mexico. (A phenomenon that the ￿sudden stops￿literature (e.g. Calvo 1998) has tried to
explain.) To reestablish the international equilibrium, the peso depreciates leading to a trade
surplus that absorbs resources, forcing Mexican consumption to fall.19
Note that one of the key drivers of the high volatility of consumption in Mexico is the
counter-cyclicality of the price of capital. This important prediction is borne by the data. The
price of new capital20 in Mexico is very counter-cyclical at the high frequency with a correlation
between HP-￿ltered output and HP-￿ltered price of capital of -0.55.21 Interestingly, the price of
new capital is signi￿cantly more counter-cyclical in Mexico than in the US where the equivalent
correlation is -0.08.22 This may explain why consumption is as volatile as GDP in Mexico but
18Adjustment costs smooth the initial response of Mexican investment to the domestic shock. This has two
e⁄ects. On the one hand, it absorbs resources forcing consumption to decline. On the other, it increases the
persistence of the e⁄ects of the shocks, amplifying the decline in capital gains from exporting and conducting
FDI to Mexico. As a result, the price of capital in Mexico ￿ uctuates more genarating a larger appreciation in
the Mexican price of capital which leads to higher interest rates in response to the shock.
19The strong counter-cyclical current account is documented by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) in a sample of
developing countries (which includes Mexico).
20This is measured by the investment de￿ ator over the GDP de￿ ator.
21The counter-cyclicality of the price of new capital in Mexico is robust to other ￿ltering methods. For
example, the correlation between the growth rate in the price of capital and HP-￿ltered output is -0.65.
22Over the medium term cycle the correlation between the Mexican price of capital and GDP is -0.71. In
21not in the US.
Comparing Figures 1 and 5, it is clear that the high relative volatility of consumption in
Mexico is driven by Mexican shocks rather than by US shocks. This is the case because Mexican
shocks have a much larger e⁄ect on Mexican interest rates than US shocks. Intuitively, US
shocks trigger a more persistent decline in Mexican output than Mexican shocks. As a result,
Mexican companies want to cut their investment more drastically in response to them. This
leads to a larger initial increase in the price of installed capital (P I
S) which reduces the increase
in the slope of P I
S due to the gradual increase in the price of new capital (P K
S ).23 Hence, the
lower increase in interest rates following a recessionary shock in the US vs. Mexico.
Before moving on to the quantitative analysis of the model it is worthwhile making a remark
about the relative volatility of consumption and output in the US. Note that, according to Figure
3, consumption is more volatile than output in the model. This is a counter-factual prediction
that follows from the assumption that the US only trades with Mexico. This assumption implies
that the price of capital in the US increases very gradually in response to a decline in FDI to
Mexico. (Recall that transferring the production of intermediate goods reduces their price in
the US.) As argued above, the prospect of a higher future price of capital in the US reduces
the decline in current investment and increases current and future interest rates leading to a
larger decline in US consumption.
In reality, the US imports a large share of its intermediate goods from many countries in
addition to Mexico including many developed economies that do not obtain their intermediate
goods only from the US. As a result, the actual number of intermediate goods imported by the
US is more independent from US shocks than in the model and the price of capital in the US
increases less gradually than in Figure 3. This intuition is illustrated in Figure A2 were we
present the impulse responses (to the three types of shocks) of the version of the model without
the international di⁄usion of intermediate goods. In this extreme case where US shocks do
not a⁄ect the technology available for production in other countries, the initial response of
investment is much more pronounced than in Figure 3 and the response of the US price of
capital is less gradual. This results in a consumption process that is less volatile than US
the US, the correlation between these variables over the medium term is -0.55. For the full post-war period
the correlations in the US are slightly larger (in absolute value). -0.18 for HP-￿ltered data and -0.66 over the
medium term.
23A decline in investment leads to an increase in the price of installed capital because the adjustment costs
embedded in (3) imply that lower levels of investment today increase the costs of investment tomorrow.
22output.24
Next, we look at the Mexican post-1990 data as a case study to evaluate the predictions of
our model.
4.3 Mexico 1990-200725
As in many other developing economies,26 Mexican output is more volatile than that of the
US. Table 1 reports the standard deviation of GDP per working age person27 at the business
cycle (or high) frequency (￿rst column) and over the medium term cycle (third column) for
the US (row 10) and Mexico (row 1).28 Mexico￿ s output ￿ uctuations at high and medium term
frequencies are approximately twice more volatile than those of the US.
Our model predicts that an important factor contributing to the higher volatility of the
Mexican economy is that Mexican GDP responds signi￿cantly to US shocks while the US does
not respond much to Mexican shocks. To explore these predictions Figure 7A plots US and
Mexican GDP ￿ltered using an HP ￿lter to capture the high frequency (i.e. business cycle)
￿ uctuations. The correlation coe¢ cient between the two is 0.43 and, despite the short length of
the series, it is signi￿cant at the 10% level. Beyond this statistic, the internet-driven expansion
in the US during the second half of the 90s was accompanied by a similar expansion in Mexico.
The 2001 US recession driven by the burst of the dot-com bubble also coincided with a decline
in Mexican GDP that quickly recovered following the US expansion between 2002 and 2007.
Finally, the US ￿nancial crisis of 2008 also had a strong impact in Mexican GDP though this
24This is also the case in the single-country model of Comin and Gertler (2006) where the volatility of
consumption and output match the US data.
25We restrict our attention to the post 1990 period for two reasons. First, the volume of US-Mexico trade
and FDI increased very signi￿cantly during this period making the mechanisms emphasized by our model much
more relevant than before. Second, after 1990 FDI became the most signi￿cant source of capital ￿ ows from
developed to developing economies making the model￿ s assumptions about the capital markets most appropriate
for this period.
26See, for example, Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
27In what follows we scale all variables by working age population, i.e. population aged between 16 and 64.
28To be precise, we follow the de￿nitions of medium term used by Comin and Gertler (2006). In particular,
the sort run or high frequency will be measured using an HP ￿lter which roughly isolates frequencies associates
with cycles of amplitude smaller than 8 years. The medium term refers to frequencies associated with cycles of
amplitude between 8 and 50 years. The medium term cycle is the ￿sum￿of the high frequency and the medium
term. That is, it captures cycles with amplitude smaller than 50 years. Comin and Gertler (2006) show that
despite the relatively short time series, medium term cycles can be identi￿ed in the data quite precisely.
23did not show yet in 2008 average annual output.29
It seems reasonable to argue that none of these shocks had a direct e⁄ect on the Mexican
economy and, therefore, the co-movement with US GDP resulted from the international trans-
mission of US ￿ uctuations. The only important Mexican shock over this period was the 1995
recession which, despite its virulence, was relatively short-lived and had no e⁄ect on the US.
These observations are consistent with our model predictions that domestic shocks to S have
less persistent consequences in S than shocks to N; and have virtually no e⁄ect on N:
The model also predicts that US shocks should have an e⁄ect on medium term ￿ uctuations
in Mexico and that this e⁄ect should be strongest with a lag. The ￿rst row of Table 3 reports
the correlation between HP-￿ltered US GDP at various lags and the medium term component
of Mexican GDP. Speci￿cally, the contemporaneous correlation is 0.28 and increases to 0.49
after a year and to 0.53 after two. Despite the short length of the series, the lagged correlation
coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at conventional levels.
To obtain a better understanding of the data that underlies this co-movement pattern, Figure
7B plots the medium term component of Mexican GDP together with HP-￿ltered US GDP.
The lead-lag relationship between these variables can be most notably seen during the post
1995 expansion, the 2001 recession and the post 2001 expansion. Despite the severity of the
e⁄ect of the Tequila crisis on the medium term component of Mexican GDP, the latter strongly
recovered with the US post-1995 expansion. The Mexican recovery lagged the US boom by
about two years. The end of the Mexican expansion also lagged the end of the US expansion
by one year. Finally, the post-2001 US expansion also coincided with a boom in the medium
term component of Mexican GDP.
In contrast, the cross-correlogram between HP-￿ltered Mexican GDP and the medium term
component of Mexican GDP (row 3) monotonically declines after the maximum correlation that
occurs contemporaneously.30
To conclude this brief case study, we explore whether the margins that generate the co-
movement in our model are also pro-cyclical in the data. Table 2 shows that bilateral trade
￿ ows between the US and Mexico are pro-cyclical. The table also reports the cyclicality of
29Between 2007:IV and 2008:IV Mexican real GDP declined by 1.75%. In contrast, annual GDP increased by
1.4% between 2007 and 2008.
30Figures A3 and A4 show similar co-movement patterns when using VAR methods to identify high frequency
innovations to US and Mexican GDP. Speci￿cally, we identify US shocks and Mexican shocks by running bivariate
VARs under the identi￿cation restriction that innovations to US GDP may a⁄ect Mexico contemporaneously
but innovations to Mexican GDP (or any other Mexican variable) do not a⁄ect the US contemporaneously.
24two measures of the increment in the number of intermediate goods exported from the US to
Mexico. Namely, the growth rate of the number of 6-digit classi￿cation codes in manufacturing
and in durable manufacturing in which the volume of exports from the US to Mexico is larger
than $1 million in a given year. These measures of the extensive margin of trade vary also
pro-cyclically with both US and Mexican GDPs. Finally, Table 2 reports a positive (though
insigni￿cant) co-movement between US FDI to Mexico (as a share of Mexican GDP) and both
US and Mexican GDP. Reassuringly, this co-movement becomes statistically signi￿cant when
we remove some noise from the FDI series by ￿ltering it to keep the medium term ￿ uctuations.
4.4 Simulations
After showing that, qualitatively, our model is consistent with the main patterns in the data we
next explore its ability to account for them quantitatively. To this end, we calibrate the volatility
and persistence of wage markups shocks in the US and Mexico and run 1000 simulations over
a 17-year long horizon each. Speci￿cally, we impose the same autocorrelation for the wage
markups in both Mexico and the US (0.6 annually) to re￿ ect our view that much of the di⁄erence
in the persistence of the ￿reduced form￿shocks that hit the two economies arises from the
endogenous international di⁄usion of technologies.31
We calibrate the volatility of the shocks by forcing the model to match the high frequency
standard deviation of GDP in Mexico and the US. This yields a volatility of the wage markup
shock of 3.76% in the US and 4.97% in Mexico. Note that this signi￿cantly higher volatility of
the Mexican shock is consistent with the view that developing economies su⁄er larger shocks
than developed neighbors. Below we explore whether the higher volatility of the shocks is a
signi￿cant factor in explaining the higher GDP volatility in developing economies.
Volatility
Table 1 compares the standard deviations of the high frequency and medium term cycle
￿ uctuations in the data and in the model. Our calibration strategy forces the model to match
the volatilities of output in Mexico and the US at the high frequency. In addition, the model
31We borrow this value from Comin and Gertler (2006) that estimate that this is the required autocorrelation
to match the persistence of the US total markup (i.e. the sum of the price and wage markup). Note that,
because of the propagation obtained from the endogenous technology mechanisms, this class of models require a
smaller autocorrelation of the shocks to match the persistence in macro variables. In short, they are not a⁄ected
by the Cogley and Nason (1995) criticism that the Neoclassical growth model does not propagate exogenous
disturbances.
25also matches the observed volatility of output over the medium term both in Mexico (0.038
vs. 0.037 in the data) and in the US (0.02 vs. 0.015 in the data). Note that there is nothing
in our calibration strategy that forces the model to matching the variance of output at lower
frequencies. Matching these moments implies that the model induces the right amount of
propagation of high frequency shocks into the medium term.
The model does a good job in reproducing the volatility observed in the data in variables
other than output. It does a remarkable job in matching the volatility of consumption in Mexico
both at the high frequency (0.03 vs. 0.031 in the data) and over the medium term cycle (0.038
vs. 0.04 in the data). This is of special interest given the attention that the international macro
literature has given to these moments.
It also generates series for investment, the relative price of capital, bilateral trade ￿ ows, the
extensive margin of trade and FDI ￿ ows that on average have similar volatilities to those ob-
served in the data. For those instances where there is some di⁄erences, the empirical volatilities
fall within the 95% con￿dence interval for the standard deviation of the simulated series.32
Co-movement
Table 2 reports the contemporaneous correlation between the HP-￿ltered Mexican variables
and HP-￿ltered output in both Mexico and the US. Broadly speaking, the model does a very
good job in capturing the contemporaneous co-movement patterns both within Mexico but also
between Mexico and the US. First, the model generates the strong co-movement between US
and Mexican GDPs observed in the data. Speci￿cally, the average correlation between these
variables in our simulations is 0.71 with a con￿dence interval of (0.4 , 0.9) that contains the
correlation observed in the data (i.e. 0.43).
Second, the model generates the observed correlation between consumption and output in
Mexico (0.76 vs. 0.78 in the data). Note also that, in both model and data, Mexican consump-
tion is insigni￿cantly correlated with US GDP. This indicates that US shocks do not contribute
to the high volatility of Mexican consumption. This instead is the result of the response of
Mexican consumption to domestic shocks.
A key driver of the volatility of consumption are the dynamics of the price of capital induced
by domestic shocks. It is reassuring that the model matches closely the negative co-movement
between Mexican output and the price of new capital (-0.45 vs. -0.54 in the data). Note also
32Note that the model also underpredicts the volatility of the extensive margin of trade, though given the
distance between the measure in the model and in the data that should not be a surprise. Note also that, as
discussed in section 4.2, the model generates a process for US consumption that is too volatile.
26that the model generates an insigni￿cant contemporaneous co-movement between the price of
capital in Mexico and US GDP which is also consistent with the evidence (-0.13 in model vs.
0.13 in data). This is the case because, as we shall see below, US shocks a⁄ect the price of new
capital over the medium term but not so much contemporaneously.
Recall that the strong co-movement between US output and Mexican investment is the key
driver of the large e⁄ect that US shocks have on Mexican GDP. The model matches very closely
the observed strong co-movement between Mexican investment and output in both the US (0.69
vs. 0.6 in the data) and Mexico (0.77 vs. 0.62 in the data).
Similarly, recall that the medium term productivity dynamics in Mexico result from the
cyclicality of the ￿ ow of intermediate goods that become exportable to Mexico (i.e. the extensive
margin of trade). The model matches quite closely the co-movement between the growth in
the number of varieties exported to Mexico (specially in durable manufacturing) and output in
both the US (0.42 vs. 0.28 in the data) and in Mexico (0.42 vs. 0.42 in the data).
The model also broadly captures the cyclicality of the bilateral trade ￿ ows which are also
partly responsible for the co-movement between the US and Mexican GDPs. In particular the
model captures the fact that Mexican imports from the US co-move more with Mexican GDP
(0.82 vs. 0.93 in the data) than Mexican exports to the US (0.59 vs. 0.08 in the data). The
model is also consistent with the strong co-movement of US GDP and both Mexican imports
from the US (0.81 vs. 0.61 in the data) and exports to the US (0.56 vs. 0.68 in the data).
Interestingly, .
Finally, the model captures the strong counter-cyclicality of Mexican trade balance. Specif-
ically, the correlation between the Mexican trade balance as a share of GDP is -0.98 vs. -0.83
in the data. The model is also consistent with the higher (in absolute terms) correlation of the
Mexican trade balance with Mexican GDP than with US GDP (-0.74 vs. 0.07 in the data).33 It
however generates FDI ￿ ows that are too cyclical maybe because of the presence of a small but
volatile component in actual FDI that does not respond to the US or Mexican business cycle.
Inter-frequency co-movement
A ￿nal fact presented in section 4.3 is the lead of US output over medium term ￿ uctuations
in Mexico. Table 3 explores the model￿ s ability to capture this fact. The ￿rst row reports the
empirical correlation between lagged HP-￿ltered US output and the medium term component of
Mexican output. The second row reports the average cross-correlation across 1000 simulations
33The higher counter-cyclicality of the Mexican trade balance with respect to US GDP in the model than in
the data surely results from the lack of other international shocks.
27of the model. The model roughly captures the contemporaneous correlation between high
frequency ￿ uctuations in US output and medium term ￿ uctuations in Mexican output (0.38
in the model vs. 0.28 in the data). More importantly, the model generates a hump-shaped
cross-correlogram between these two variables as we observed in the data. However, in the data
the peak correlation occurs after two years (0.53), while in the model it occurs on average after
one (0.45).
A key prediction of our model is that the high frequency response of the extensive margin
of trade to US shocks generates counter-cyclical ￿ uctuations in the relative price of capital in
Mexico over the medium term. The fourth row in Table 3 presents a quantitative evaluation
of this prediction where we report the average correlation across our 1000 simulations between
the medium term component of the Mexican relative price of capital and HP-￿ltered US output
at various lags. The correlation becomes more negative as we lag US GDP reaching a peak (in
absolute terms) after two years (-0.42). This co-movement pattern matches quite closely the
actual co-movement in the data reported in the third row of Table 3. There we can also see
that the correlation between US GDP and the medium term component of the relative price of
capital in Mexico gradually becomes more negative as we lag US GDP. The peak in reached at
-0.5 with a 3-year lag of US GDP over the Mexican price of capital.
Mexican and US shocks have a di⁄erent e⁄ect on Mexican medium term ￿ uctuations. Row
5 in Table 3 reports the actual correlation between HP-￿ltered Mexican output at various lags
and the medium term component of Mexican output. Though the contemporaneous correlation
is positive it declines monotonically as we lag the series of HP-￿ltered output.34 Our model is
consistent with this co-movement pattern since, unlike US shocks, Mexican shocks in our model
do not induce a hump-shaped response of Mexican output (Figure 5). This is illustrated in row
6 of Table 3. The contemporaneous correlation between HP-￿ltered and medium term Mexican
GDP is 0.6 (vs. 0.45 in the data) and it becomes insigni￿cant when lagging HP-￿ltered GDP
by two years (vs. one in the data).
Finally, in both, the model and the data (rows 7 and 8 in Table 3), we observe similar co-
movement pattern between HP-￿ltered Mexican GDP and the medium term component of the
Mexican price of capital. In both we observe that the counter-cyclicality of the medium term
component of the price of capital in Mexico increases as we increased the lag reaching a peak
of -0.34 after 2 years in the data vs. -0.52 after one year in the model.
34In table A4, we make a similar point by estimating VARs with HP-￿ltered Mexican GDP and the medium
term component of several Mexican variables (including GDP).
28Implications for Aggregate Volatility
It is clear from Figure 1 that US shocks are a signi￿cant source of volatility in Mexican GDP.
But, what share of Mexican ￿ uctuations is due to US shocks and what share is due to domestic
shocks? Similarly, how much do Mexican shocks contribute to the volatility of US GDP?
Table 4 answers these questions by reporting the share of output volatility in each country
attributable to each kind of shocks. The ￿rst two columns focus on the volatility of HP-
￿ltered output while the next two focus on the volatility of output over the medium term cycle.
Consistent with Figure 5, Mexican shocks account for a small fraction of US ￿ uctuations (3%
at high frequency and 2% over the medium term cycle).
In contrast, US shocks represent a very signi￿cant source of Mexican ￿ uctuations. At the
high frequency, 64% of Mexican GDP volatility is driven by US shocks, while over the medium
term cycle, US shocks induce 66% of the volatility in Mexican GDP. This proves the importance
of explicitly modelling the US economy to study the business and medium term cycles of the
Mexican economy.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a two country asymmetric model to study the business cycle in developing
countries. The model has two distinct elements for which we have plenty of micro evidence:
the endogenous and slow di⁄usion of technologies from the developed to the developing country
and the presence of ￿ ow adjustment costs to investment in the developing economy. When
calibrated to the Mexican economy, our model generates three important features of Mexican
business cycles.
First, US shocks have a larger e⁄ect on Mexican than on US GDP. This result is driven by
the larger amplitude of ￿ uctuations in Mexican productivity and by the e⁄ects that this has
on investment. This ￿nding has important implications for the sources of Mexican volatility.
Despite the higher volatility of Mexican shocks, the di⁄erential in GDP volatility between US
and Mexico is due to the magnitude of the Mexican response to US shocks.
Second, the slow di⁄usion of technologies to Mexico generates a hump-shaped response in
Mexican output in response to US shocks. As a result, US shocks have more persistent e⁄ects
on Mexico than in the US. Further, this explains the observed lead of US GDP over the medium
term component of Mexican output and the relative price of capital.
Third, consumption is no less volatile than output in Mexico. Our model accounts for this
29stylized fact because a Mexican recession slows down the di⁄usion of technologies to Mexico,
generating a gradual increase in the price of installed capital. As a result, Mexican interest rates
increase despite the lower marginal product of capital and consumption drops precipitously.
Of course to study how the extensive margin of trade and FDI respond to US shocks, it
is necessary to model both the US and the Mexican economy. The complexity that entails
developing a two country model of business cycles with endogenous technology is not trivial.
However, by doing that we have not only been able to match the three stylized facts described
above but have provided a quantitatively accurate account of high and medium term ￿ uctua-
tions in Mexico. A reasonable educated guess is that the mechanisms introduced in our model
should provide an accurate account of business cycles in other developing countries.
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33A Symmetric equilibrium
This section describes the complete set of equations that determine the symmetric equilibrium.
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t=0 satisfy the laws of motion in
the equations (3), (19), (22) and (33).
￿ The endogenous variables solve the producers and consumers problems in equations (48)
through (69).
￿ Feasibility is satis￿ed in (41), (42) and (43)
￿ Prices are such that market clears.
The equilibrium relations of this model are:
Resource constraint in N and S :












NtJNt + GNt (41)
+



























production of investment goods












StJSt + GSt (42)
+






















production of investment goods







where ￿ct is a TFP shock.
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Market value of ￿rms that produce local, global and transferred intermediate goods:

























































































Optimal development and di⁄usion of intermediate goods:
St = ￿R
￿1
























































































































37The exogenous variables, f￿w
ct; ￿ct; ￿ctg follow AR(1) processes.
B Calibration
In this appendix we describe the calibration of the twelve standard parameters and the six
parameters that relate to the R&D process. We set the discount factor ￿ equal to 0:95; to
match the steady state share of non-residential investment to output. Based on steady state
evidence we also choose the following number: (the capital share) ￿ = 0:33; (government
consumption to output) GN=YN = 0:2 and GS=YS = 0:1; (the depreciation rate) ￿ = 0:1; and
(the steady state utilization rate) U = 0:8; based on the average capacity utilization level in
the postwar period as measured by the Board of Governors. We set the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply ￿ at unity, which represents an intermediate value for the range of
estimates across the micro and macro literature. Similarly, we set the elasticity the change
in the depreciation rate with respect the utilization rate, (￿
00=￿
0)U at 0:15, used for example
in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Comin, Gertler and Santacreu (2009). Finally, based on
evidence in Basu and Fernald (1997), we ￿x the steady state gross valued added markup in the
consumption goods sector, ￿c equal to 1:1 and the corresponding markup for the capital goods
sector, ￿k at 1:15:
We set the population of the US relative to Mexico to 3. Similarly, we set the relative
productivity levels in ￿nal goods production so that US GDP is approximately 12 times Mexico￿ s
GDP.
We next turn to the ￿non-standard￿parameters. The estimates for the obsolescence rate
have range from the 4% per year in Caballero and Ja⁄e (1992) to around 20% in Pakes and
Schankerman (1984). Based on this range we consider an obsolescence rate of 10% which implies
a value for ￿ of 0.9. The steady state growth rates of GDP and the relative price of capital
in the model are functions of the growth rate of new technologies, which in our model are
used to produce new capital, and of the exogenous growth rate of disembodied productivity, g.
By using the balanced growth restrictions and matching the average growth rate of non-farm
business output per working age person (0.024) and the average growth rate of the Gordon
quality adjusted price of capital relative to the BEA price of consumption goods and services
(-0.026), we can identify the growth rate of disembodied productivity, g; and the productivity
38parameters in the technologies for creating new intermediate goods, ￿: Accordingly, we set:
g = 0:0072 and ￿ = 2:69.
There is no direct evidence on the gross markup # for specialized intermediate goods. Given
the specialized nature of these products, it seems that an appropriate number would be at the
high range of the estimates of markups in the literature for other types of goods. Accordingly
we choose a value of 1:5, but emphasize that our results are robust to reasonable variations
around this number.
There is also no simple way to identify the elasticity of new intermediate goods with respect
to R&D, ￿. Griliches (1990) presents some estimates using the number of new patents as
a proxy for technological change. The estimates are noisy and range from about 0:6 to 1:0,
depending on the use of panel versus cross-sectional data. We opt for a conservative value of
0.65 in the lower range. The calibrations of #; ￿; ￿ and ￿ yield a R&D share in US GDP of
approximately 1 percent which is in line with the average of private R&D expenditures in the
investment goods sector over GDP over the period 1960-2006.
The value of the Mexican oil production P EES is set to to match the share of Mexican oil
exports in GDP. The elasticity of gross output with respect to oil (￿) is set to 1.5% following
the calculations in Blanchard and Gali (2007).
Finally, we ￿x the autocorrelation of the preference/wage markup shock to 0.6 so that the
model generates an autocorrelation that approximately matches that of the total markup as
measured by Gali, Gertler and Lopez Salido (2002). We set the autocorrelation of the TFP
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Figure 1: IR to a U.S. Markup Shock in Baseline Model. (US dash, Mexico solid)
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Figure 4: IR to Shocks to Markup, TFP and Price of Investment in the U.S. in %DVHOLQHModel 
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Figure A1: IR to Shocks to Markup, TFP and Price of Investment in the U.S. in Model without AC
TFP (negative)
markup


























S Xg, Xt 
1



















































S Xg, Xt 
1
Figure A2: IR to Shocks to Markup, TFP and Price of Investment in the U.S. in Model without International Diffusion of Technology
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            Figure A3: Medium-run Response of Mexico’s Variables to Detrended US GDP Innovations 
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               Note 1: Intervals of confidence at 90%. 
               Note 2: US GDP and other variables are filtered by Hodrick-Prescott and Band Pass Filter (frequency 8-50 years)  
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Figure A4: Medium-run Response of Mexico’s Variables to Detrended Mexico GDP Innovations 
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                Note 1: Intervals of confidence at 90%. 
                Note 2: Mexico’s GDP and other variables are filtered by Hodrick-Prescott and Band Pass Filter (frequency 8-50 years) 
               respectively. 
                Note 3: All variables except FDI in VAR are in labor-force units.  
 
 Table 1 : Volatility Model vs. Data
MEXICO Data Model Data Model
GDP  0.026 0.026 0.037 0.038
(0.015 , 0.041) (0.018 , 0.068)
CONSUMPTION 0.031 0.03 0.040 0.038
(0.017, 0.044) (0.021 , 0.059) 
INVESTMENT 0.079 0.068 0.082 0.11
(0.032 , 0.124) (0.041 , 0.22)
RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL 0.029 0.021 0.042 0.033
(0.01 , 0.044) (0.02 , 0.06)
IMPORTS (FROM US) 0.090 0.050 0.117 0.078
(0.025 , 0.09)  (0.032 , 0.15)
EXPORTS (TO US) 0.090 0.048 0.134 0.080
(0.02 , 0.088)  (0.027 , 0.17)










FDI/GDP 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.02
(0.002 , 0.013) (0.007, 0.049)
US Data Model Data Model
GDP 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.020
(0.009 , 0.024) (0.01 1, 0.035)
CONSUMPTION 0.008 0.020 0.012 0.025
(0.013 , 0.029) (0.014 , 0.04)










Data Model Data Model
GDP  0.43* 0.71 1.00 1.00
(0.4, 0.9)  
CONSUMPTION 0.02 0.35 0.78*** 0.76
(‐0.28, 0.78) (0.39, 0.95)
INVESTMENT 0.6*** 0.69 0.62*** 0.77
(0.47, 0.85) (0.41, 0.94)
RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL 0.13 ‐0.13 ‐0.54*** ‐0.45
(‐0.53, 0.26) (‐0.77 , 0.01)
IMPORTS (FROM US) 0.61*** 0.81 0.83*** 0.82
(0.67, 0.9) (0.52, 0.96)
EXPORTS (TO US) 0.68*** 0.56 0.08 0.59
(0.21, 0.81) (0.03, 0.89)
MEXICAN TRADE SURPLUS/GDP 0.07 ‐0.74 ‐0.83*** ‐0.98
























Data 0.28 0.49* 0.53** 0.39
Model 0.38** 0.45** 0.38** 0.21
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL IN MEX 
Data 0.35 0.02 ‐0.24 ‐0.5**
Model ‐0.15 ‐0.34* ‐0.42* ‐0.38
01 2 3
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT MEX GDP
Data 04 5 ** 03 2 00 5 ‐01 6
Lags of High Frequency US Output
Lags of High Frequency MEX Output
Data 0.45 0.32 0.05 ‐0.16
Model 0.6** 0.52** 0.29 ‐0.01
MEDIUM TERM COMPONENT RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL IN MEX 
Data ‐0.13 ‐0.32 ‐0.34 ‐0.22





US volatility Mexican volatility US volatility Mexican volatility
US Shocks 0.97 0.64 0.98 0.66
Mexico Shocks 0.03 0.36 0.02 0.34
Note: Share of output volatility in the relevant country at the relevant frequency associated to shocks either from the US or Mexico
High frequency fluctuations are isolated using a Hodrick‐Prescott filter with filtering parameter 100. Medium term cycle is obtained
 by using a Band Pass filter that isolates fluctuations associated with cycles of period shorter than 50 years.
High Frequency Medium Term Cycle